We investigate the nascent but fast-growing Chinese bond market and credit rating industry. We find Chinese bond ratings are informative and significantly correlated with bond offering yields. In addition, the Chinese bond investors distinguish ratings from different credit rating agencies (CRAs), demanding lower yields on bonds rated by CRAs with better reputations and more stringent rating standards. However, the empirical results suggest that the rating scales used by Chinese CRAs are not comparable to those of international CRAs. Furthermore, Chinese CRAs have very broad rating scales and pool bonds with significantly different default risks into a single rating category, resulting in over 90% of bonds in only three rating categories.
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Are Chinese Credit Ratings Relevant? A Study of the Chinese Bond Market and Credit Rating Industry
Over the last four decades, the Chinese bond market has grown from virtually nonexistent to $5.4 trillion in total amount outstanding by the end of 2015. It is now the third largest bond market in the world (GSAM, 2015) . In recent years, the Chinese government is increasingly opening its once-closed capital market to international investors. For example, in February 2016, the People's Bank of China (PBoC), the Chinese central bank, relaxed the requirements for foreign institutional investors to access the Chinese interbank bond market and scrapped the quotas previously allocated to foreign investors, allowing most foreign institutional investors unrestricted participation in the Chinese bond market , Trivedi, 2016 ). Yet, this nascent but fast-growing bond market, particularly the non-governmental bond market, has received little academic attention.
Along with the development of the bond market, the Chinese credit rating industry has experienced significant growth. Its industry structure and regulatory environment are very different from those in the US and Europe. Furthermore, there is a generally negative perception of the quality of Chinese bond ratings. The fact that the vast majority of Chinese bonds are rated AA or better has raised doubts about the accuracy of Chinese ratings and concerns of overoptimism of Chinese credit rating agencies (CRAs) and/or rating shopping (Baglole, 2004 , Lee, 2006 . Consequently, some critics dismiss Chinese CRAs as 'bereft of influence ' (Kennedy, 2008) .
First introduced in the mid-1980s, corporate bonds in China were initially required by regulators to obtain third-party guarantees, mostly by state-owned banks.
1 Furthermore, the coupon rates were set by the government (S&P, 2009) . In 2006, the first corporate bond without a third-party guarantee was issued, initiating the development of the real corporate credit market in China. Without third-party guarantees, coupon rates are no longer dictated by the government but set by the market.
This study examines the factors that determine the Chinese public bond offering yields, particularly the role played by the credit ratings. If Chinese bond ratings are informative about default risk, we expect the offering bond yields are correlated with credit ratings. In addition, we directly test the information content of Chinese bond ratings by examining the determinants of the bond ratings. With an ordered probit model, we test whether common accounting ratios and market based variables, good predictors of default risk found in other studies, are indeed incorporated into Chinese bond ratings.
Using newly issued domestic bonds from 2009 to 2015, we first find that Chinese bond ratings are significantly correlated with bond yields. Holding bond features and issuer characteristics constant, lower rated bonds have significantly higher yield spreads. This suggests that Chinese bond ratings are informative. 2 Second, while Chinese bond ratings are revealing about bond yields, they seem to be incompatible with the rating scales of international CRAs, even though they use the same alpha-numerical symbols. For example, the average Treasury yield spread for AAA rated Chinese domestic bonds from 2009 to 2015 is 152 basis points.
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During the same time period, the Merrill Lynch Global AAA Corporate Bond index has a daily average yield spread of 85 basis points. The 152-basis-point spread for AAA rated Chinese banks went public, though the central government remains as the majority stockholder (see Bailey, Huang and Yang, 2011, Lin and Zhang, 2009 for an overview of the Chinese banking system).
2 Our findings do not necessarily imply that Chinese credit ratings contain information beyond and above those publicly available, nor that bond investors rely on credit ratings for bond pricing. 3 The Treasury yield spread is defined as the difference between yield on the bond and the yield on a Chinese Treasury bond with approximately the same maturity.
bonds is similar to the average daily yield spreads for the Merrill Lynch Global A Corporate Bond Index. This finding is important to bond investors, particularly as the Chinese government increasingly opens its capital market to foreign investors.
Third, we find that the vast majority of Chinese bonds fall into only three rating categories: AAA, AA+, and AA. A notch difference in Chinese ratings results in an average difference of 58 basis points in yields. In contrast, prior studies on the US and Europe bond markets find a one-notch difference in investment grade ratings is associated with a 9-to 18-basis-point difference in yields. Thus, a one-notch difference in Chinese ratings is likely equivalent to a one-letter (or three-notch) difference in international ratings. The finding suggests that Chinese CRAs have very broad rating scales and tend to pool bonds with significantly different default risks into one broad rating category.
In terms of the information content of Chinese ratings, we find that about two thirds to three quarters of the variation in Chinese bond ratings can be explained by a dozen commonly used financial ratios and market based variables, such as an issuer's market capitalization, interest coverage ratio, and total debt ratio. This provides further evidence that Chinese bond ratings contain relevant information about default risk. This study has an important policy implication. Coarse rating scales are not conducive to the development of a healthy and robust bond market. Prior studies have shown that increased competition and entrance of a new competitor in the rating market can force the incumbent CRAs to improve their rating quality and/or refine their rating scales (Doherty, Kartasheva and Phillips, 2012, Xia, 2014) . Furthermore, we find evidence that more reputable and established
CRAs have more stringent rating standards. Thus, to improve the quality and information content of Chinese bond ratings, the Chinese government should encourage more industry competition by allowing direct access by international CRAs into the domestic bond market. In addition, credit ratings on domestic bonds by international CRAs can make it easier for foreign investors to compare Chinese domestic bonds with those outside China, facilitating inflows of foreign capital into the Chinese bond market and the integration of the Chinese capital market with the international market.
This study also contributes to the debate on the reputation hypothesis of credit ratings.
CRAs maintain that their concern for reputational capital could effectively address the potential conflicts of interest inherent in the issuer-pay model and they would not sacrifice their long term reputation for short term profits and market shares (Tillman, 2007) . 5 An important and implicit assumption under the reputation hypothesis is that bond investors can and do differentiate CRAs and make decisions based on their perceived reputation. The findings in this study validate the underlying assumption of the reputation hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I gives an overview of the Chinese bond market and rating industry, their unique institutional features and regulatory environment, and the limited academic literature. Section II describes the data collection and summary 5 The extant literature on the reputation hypothesis of credit rating has mixed findings (see Covitz and Harrison, 2003 , Jiang, Stanford, and Xie, 2012 , Kraft, 2015 .
statistics. Section III presents the main empirical findings on the determinants of bond offering yields and Section IV investigates the determinants of Chinese bond ratings. Section V concludes the paper.
I. Background and Literature Review
A. Description of the Chinese Bond Market Figure 1 depicts the amount of debt outstanding, year-over-year growth rates, and annual GDP growth rates from 2001 to 2015. The average annual growth rate of the debt market is 23%, far outpacing the average annual GDP growth rate of about 10%.
The Chinese bond market is dominated by government and government-related issues. 6 Chinese policy banks, agencies of the Chinese central government, were established in 1994 to take over noncommercial lending from the state-owned commercial banks. They provide financing for central governmentinvested projects. The three policy banks are China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China, and Agricultural Development Bank of China (see Lin and Zhang, 2009, and Bailey, Huang and Yang, 2011 , for more detailed discussion on the Chinese policy banks Individual investors only account for a very small piece of the market. Thus, the Chinese bond market is dominated by institutional investors.
B. An Overview of the Credit Rating Industry in China
A well-established credit rating industry is crucial for a healthy and vigorous bond market. To support the development of the bond market, the Chinese government fostered the establishment of a credit rating industry by a few mandatory regulatory rating requirements in the 1990s. For example, the PBoC issued a requirement on December 16, 1997 that all enterprise bonds must obtain credit ratings from its approved CRAs (PBoC, 1997). Kennedy (2008) and Poon and Chan (2008) provide detailed descriptions of the early development of the Chinese credit rating industry. In addition, to protect its nascent credit rating industry, the 11 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the regulator of the Chinese securities and futures markets. National Development and Reform Commission is China's primary economic planning and policy agency with broad control over the Chinese economy. One of its functions is 'to draft relevant laws and regulations concerning national economic and social development.' 12 In our sample, more than 99% of enterprise bond issuers are SOEs. On the other hands, about a third of corporate bonds are issued by non-SOEs. 13 The exchange market is mainly regulated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Investors in the exchange market include both institutional and retail investors.
Chinese government effectively forbids foreign CRAs to issue ratings directly on domestic Chinese bonds.
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The industry structure and regulatory environment of the Chinese credit rating industry are quite different from those in the US. Unlike the oligopolistic competition among the Big Three CRAs (Moody's, S&P and Fitch) in the US, the Chinese credit rating industry today is still developing with close to a dozen CRAs; eight major ones are listed in Finally, another unique feature of the Chinese credit rating industry is that almost all public bonds have only one rating, and no Chinese CRA has an unsolicited rating policy. While regulators (PBoC, CSRC and NDRC) require public bonds rated by approved CRAs, they do not specify the number of ratings, effectively setting the minimum required number of rating to one.
In our unfiltered sample, less than 1% of the bonds have ratings from multiple CRAs.
C. Chinese Bond Defaults
Prior to 2014, there was no actual domestic bond default in China. 21 There were instances where bond defaults, particularly by state-owned enterprises, were avoided by lastminute government bailouts (see, for example, the case of Shandong Helon in 2012 as discussed in Zhen, 2013, page 67 
D. Literature on Chinese Bond Market and Credit Ratings
Despite the large size and the fast growth of the Chinese bond market, there are, to our knowledge, very few academic studies (in English) that investigate the Chinese bond market and credit rating industry. Chen, Mazumdar, and Surana (2011) Kennedy (2008) provides a description of the early development of the Chinese credit rating industry and the challenges and issues that it faces. Poon and Chan (2008) provides preliminary empirical evidence on the informational content of credit ratings in China. They also describe the early background and initial regulations for the industry in China. Details of later regulatory developments are presented in Xu and Weng (2011) .
II. Data and Sample Description
Data on Chinese bond yields and ratings are provided by the WIND Information Co. Ltd.
(WIND), a leading Chinese financial data provider. Another database, China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) is used to access accounting data for the bond issuers in China.
Appendix A defines the variables used in this study. We use a sample period from 2009 to 2015.
We start with 2009 for two reasons. First, the non-governmental Chinese bond market was very small prior to 2009, but experienced significant growth since then. Second, almost all corporate bonds had third-party guarantees and coupon rates were set by the government prior to 2008.
There are a total of 8,338 non-governmental public and taxable bond issues from 2009 to 2015. 22 We apply several data filters (in sequence) and exclude the following bond issues. 1)
Bond issues where the type of issuer (SOEs or non-SOEs) cannot be identified (183 issues). 2)
Bond issues with third-party guarantees (1,312 issues). 3) Floating-rate, step-up, adjustable-rate and zero coupon bonds (1,660 issues). 23 4) Non-rated bond issues (82 issues), bond issues whose CRAs are not identified (15 issues), bonds rated by multiple CRAs (40 issues), or rated by a CRA not included in our study (1 issue). 5) Convertible bonds (2 issues). 6) Issues with maturity less than one year (3 issues). 7) Bonds rated below AA-rating (43 issues). 8) Bonds by issuers whose ages are not identified (29 issues).
22 During the sample period, there are 1,545 privately placed bond issues which are not included in our sample because the majority of them are either not rated and/or have a third party guarantee. 23 Vast majority of non-fixed coupon bonds are step-up notes and adjustable coupon bonds.
The final sample includes 4,968 bond issues. evidence supports the non-comparable-rating-scale explanation. For example, property developer Evergrande Group received AAA ratings from three Chinese CRAs on its domestic bond issue in June 2015, while S&P, Moody's, and Fitch maintained non-investment ratings on the firm's foreign bonds (Yam, 2015) . 26 The large difference in Treasury Yield Spreads can be partially explained by the differences in credit ratings between Central SOE bonds (1.406) and those of Local SOEs and Non-SOEs (2.542 and 2.637 respectively). 27 Corporate bond market has grown significantly over our sample period, but more than half of corporate bonds are private-placements and/or non-rated, making them ineligible for our sample. In addition, a large percentage of corporate bonds has third party guarantees, further limiting the number of corporate bonds in the sample. 28 While the average rating for financial bonds is better than that of enterprise bonds, the difference is less than half a notch: 2.277 vs. 2.651.
As to trading venues, three fourths of the sample is traded in the interbank market and the remainder in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Finally, about 13% of the bonds are issued by firms with publicly traded equity. Table 5 reports the rating distribution by the eight CRAs in our sample.
Chengxin_Moody has the largest market share of 1,167 bond issues. Dagong, Pengyuan, Lianhe_Fitch and Brilliance are also major players in the market. Jincheng, Lianhe and
Chengxin have much smaller market shares.
III. Analysis of Bond Offering Yields
A. Methodology
In this section, we empirically investigate the determinants of Chinese bond offering yields, particularly the role played by the credit ratings, in the following regression model: 
where Yield Spread is the difference, in percentage, between the bond yield to maturity at issuance and Chinese Treasury yield of similar maturity. Ratingj is a series of dummy variables with AAA rated bonds as the base case. If Chinese bond ratings are informative about default risk, we expect the coefficients on the rating dummy variables to be significantly positive and larger for lower rating dummies. GP_CRA is a dummy variable, equal to one for three of the CRAs with global partners (Brilliance, Lianhe_Fitch, and Chengxin_Moody) and zero for the other five domestic CRAs. If Chinese bond investors trust the ratings from the global-partnered CRAs more than ratings of their domestic counterparts, the coefficient on the GP_CRA dummy variable is expected to be significantly negative, i.e., investors would require lower yields on bonds with a certification from the more reputable global-partnered CRAs.
In addition to the rating variables, there are three sets of control variables that are expected to affect bond yields: bond types and features, issuer types and characteristics, and other control variables. assume an implicit government backing on SOE bonds, particularly those by Central SOEs, we expect the coefficients on the Non-SOE dummy variable to be significantly positive. In addition, some issuing firms have publicly traded equities. To control for the difference in the listing status of the issuing firm's equity, we include a Listed dummy, equal to one for issuer with publicly traded equity and zero otherwise. Issuers with publicly traded equity are likely to be more transparent due to disclosure requirements and analysts' coverage. 29 Hence, we expect 29 Chinese public firms are required to file annual, semi-annual and quarterly reports with the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in addition to special reports on significant matters, acquisitions, and clarifications. When firms apply for public equity issuance, they must provide prospectus to the CSRC and, after receiving approval from the CSRC, disclose information contained in the prospectus to the general public (OECD, 2011). bonds issued by firms with public equity to have lower yields and the coefficient on the Listed dummy to be negative. The last issuer characteristic variable is the age of the issuing firm, Age.
The last set of control variables includes the bond's trading venues, year dummies and issuer industry dummies. The Interbank dummy is set equal to one for bonds traded in the interbank market and zero for exchange-traded bonds. As the trading volume in the interbank market is much higher than that of the exchange market, the liquidity of bonds traded in the interbank market is likely to be higher than that of the exchange traded bonds (GSAM, 2015).
Thus, we expect the coefficient on the Interbank dummy to be negative. Year dummies and industry dummies are included to control for fixed year and industry effects.
B. Empirical Results
Column 1 of Table 6 reports the regression results. The numbers in the parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors. First note that the coefficients on the rating dummy variables are all significantly positive, indicating that AA+, AA and AA-rated bonds pay significant yield premiums over AAA rated bonds. Furthermore, the size of the coefficients increases as rating gets lower. This result is consistent with Poon and Chan's (2008) finding that Chinese bond ratings are informative and investors do pay attention to bond ratings, contrary to some critics' argument of rating irrelevance in China (see, for example, Kennedy, 2003 and Lee, 2006) .
In addition, the differences in the rating dummy coefficients are very large. A one-notch difference in rating results in a difference of about 50 to 70 basis points in yield spreads, consistent with the univariate analysis in the previous section. In studies of the US and European bond markets, the yield difference between AAA rated bonds and AA rated bonds is typically about 20 to 30 basis points, and the difference between AAA rated and A rated bonds ranges from 40 to 100 basis points. Appendix B summarizes findings in three studies on the US and Overall, findings are mixed with regard to the quality of Chinese bond ratings. On the one hand, we do find empirical evidence that they are informative and revealing about bond offering yields. Furthermore, there is evidence that reputation matters in the Chinese rating industry. However, the large yield spreads on highly rated Chinese bonds suggest that Chinese credit ratings are not comparable with the rating scales of international CRAs. While Chinese ratings do seem to differentiate bonds of different quality, non-comparability is a potential concern for foreign investors not familiar with the Chinese bond market. More importantly, there is strong evidence that Chinese bond ratings are coarse, resulting in pooling of bonds with significantly different default risks into one rating category.
IV. Determinants of Chinese Bond Ratings
This section tests the information content of Chinese bond ratings directly by examining the factors determining ratings. As prior literature shows that accounting ratios and market 31 We use Chengxin_Moody as the base case because it rates more bonds in the sample than any other CRA.
based variables are important determinants of credit rating, the sample used in this section is limited to bonds issued by firms with publicly traded equity. In addition, since accounting ratios for financial firms are generally not comparable with those of non-financial firms, we exclude financials in the sample. These two filters significantly reduce the sample size. To increase sample size, we include bonds with step-up and adjustable coupon rates. While coupon structure affects bond yields, it is not expected to affect default risk and, consequently, the bond ratings.
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Following Blume, Lim and Mackinlay (1998), we build an ordered probit model of bond ratings as in equation (2). Holding the issuer characteristics constant, the coefficient on the GP_CRA would be significantly positive if the global-partnered CRAs have more stringent rating standards than their domestic brethren. In other words, global-partnered CRAs would assign lower ratings, holding the issuer characteristics constant.
In addition to the accounting ratios and market-based variables, we also include the Local SOE and Non-SOE dummy variables (with the Central SOE as the base) in the ordered probit model. Given the perceived government backing of SOEs, particularly those of the central government, we expect the type of issuer ownership would significantly affect the bond ratings.
Other control variables include year dummies and industry dummies.
Column 1 of Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for a sample of 465 bond issues with complete accounting ratios and market-based variables.
Columns 2 to 5 report the variable means for each rating category. Not surprisingly, for bonds with lower ratings, the coverage ratio and market capitalization are lower, suggesting that issuers with lower interest coverage ratios and smaller market capitalization are more likely to receive lower ratings. Equity beta and market model standard errors are higher for lower-rated bonds, indicating that issuers with higher systemic and idiosyncratic risks are rated lower. Issuers of lower-rated bonds also have higher market to book ratios. These results are consistent with findings from prior studies. On the other hand, univariate analysis does not indicate clear differences in leverage and profitability ratios between highly-rated issues and lower-rated issues.
Column 1 of Table 8 reports the results of the ordered probit model of rating. The pseudo R-squared is 0.74, comparable to prior studies with US data. Consistent with the univariate analysis, we find that the market capitalization, market to book ratio, equity beta, and market model standard errors are significant determinants of bond ratings. The coefficient of Total Debt
Ratio is also significantly positive, indicating higher Total Debt Ratio is associated with lower bond ratings. However, the coefficients on the two profitability measures are not significant.
The coefficient on the Local SOE is positive, though not significant. The coefficient on Non-SOE is 1.205 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that, holding accounting and other variables constant, ratings on Non-SOE bonds are lower than those on Central SOE bonds.
The coefficient on the GP-CRA is 0.328 and significant at the 5% level. This indicates that the ratings from global partnered CRAs are lower than ratings by the domestic CRAs, holding the issuer accounting and other market variables constant. The finding suggests that the global-partnered CRAs, as a group, have significantly more stringent rating standards than their domestic counterparts.
In Column 2 model, we replace the GP-CRA dummy with a series of CRA dummy variables. To be consistent with the yield spread regression, we use the Chengxin_Moody as the base case. The coefficients on the two global-partnered CRAs (Lianhe_Fitch and Brilliance) are significantly positive. The coefficient on Pengyuan is significantly negative while the coefficients on the other four domestic CRAs are not significant. The findings suggest that two of the global-partnered CRAs maintain significantly more stringent rating standards and one of the pure domestic CRAs (Pengyuan) has significantly more lax standards than the other CRAs.
To estimate the magnitude of the impact of the independent variables on bond ratings, we also run an OLS regression model of ratings on the same set of independent variables and the results are reported in the last column of Table 8 . The signs and significant levels of the OLS regression coefficients are similar to those of the ordered probit models.
The OLS coefficient of the Non-SOE variable is 0.364, indicating that ratings on non-SOE bonds are about one-third of a notch lower than those on Central SOE bonds. Thus, the non-SOE issuers in China face two disadvantages in the bond market. First, as shown in Table 6 , non-SOE bond issuers pay a yield premium of 57 basis points over SOEs by the Chinese central government, holding ratings constant. Second, non-SOE issuers receive ratings one-third of a notch lower than the Central SOE issuers. Given a yield spread difference of about 60 basis points for a notch difference in rating, we estimate that two effects combined result in a funding disadvantage of more than 70 basis points for non-SOEs in the Chinese public bond market.
The coefficient on the GP-CRA is 0.137, indicating that the ratings from global partnered CRAs are, on average, about one tenth of a notch lower than ratings by the domestic CRAs. The more stringent rating standards by global-partnered CRAs partially offset the lower yield premiums on bonds with ratings from these CRAs.
V. Conclusion
We study the Chinese bond market and the credit ratings. First, we find the Chinese bond ratings contain information on default risk that bond investors can use to set offering yields. In addition, Chinese bond investors differentiate ratings from different CRAs based on their perceived reputation. Global-partnered CRAs have more stringent rating standards than domestic CRAs, supporting the argument that more established CRAs are more conservative in their ratings to protect their long term reputational capital.
While informative, Chinese bond ratings are not comparable to the ratings by the international CRAs, although they use similar alpha-numerical symbols. Based on the bond Treasury yield spreads, we estimate that an AAA (AA+) rating by the Chinese CRAs is, on average, similar to an A (BBB) rating by international CRAs. Foreign investors, particularly those entering the Chinese capital market for the first time, should be aware of this significant difference in rating scales.
More importantly, our empirical study finds that the Chinese rating scales are very coarse.
A notch difference in ratings results in, on average, a difference of 58 basis points in yields. In contrast, prior studies on the US and Europe bond markets find a one-notch difference in investment grade ratings is associated with a 9-to 18-basis-point difference in yields. Thus, a one-notch difference in Chinese ratings is likely equivalent to a one-letter difference in international ratings, suggesting a very crude and coarse Chinese rating scale. A crude and coarse rating scale pools bonds with significant differences in default risk into the same rating category, failing to differentiate them based on default risk and making bond ratings less informative. This is not conducive to the development of a healthy and robust bond market.
Prior studies have shown that increased competition and entrance of new competitor in the rating market could force the incumbent CRAs to improve their rating quality and refine their rating scales. Thus, a policy implication of this study is to increase competition by allowing direct access by international CRAs into the Chinese rating industry. 
